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NEW ZEALAND'S ROLE IN THE PACIFIC THE NEW WARFARE STATE



INTRODUCTION

It is a great honour to be invited to speak at this conference to celebrate Dr Rod Alley's contribution to the study of international relations. People have recollected how Rod had influenced their lives. In my case, over a quarter of century ago, he got me interested in the issue of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. We still have a long way to go but the existing treaty is a step in the right direction. It is an example of how countries in the region can live by their hopes and not by their fears.

This presentation will deal with three groups of matters. First, it will provide an overview of the changing nature of warfare over the past few thousand years. Second, it will look at the region's problems vis-à-vis globalization and the new warfare state. Given that the Solomons is currently so much of concern, there is a case study of how the Solomons fits in with the broader issues of globalization and failed states. Third, it concludes with some recommendations about how countries should adopt an alternative philosophy in international relations. If we do what have always done, then we will get what we have always got – war. We need to think differently.



THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

There are probably almost as many conflicts underway today as during the Cold War. But there is now a new warfare state: the conflicts are internal (not international) and guerrilla (rather than conventional). Peace has not broken out. Old tribal and ethnic disputes, which may have been frozen by the Cold War, have come back to life. Others have been on the boil for decades and, now that the US and USSR are not squabbling, they have suddenly come back into view. For example, the civil war in southern Sudan is one of Africa's oldest and bloodiest civil wars but it does not get much western media coverage. The purpose of this section is to look at the changing nature of warfare.

✓ First Wave

There have been three main waves of warfare in recorded European history. First, there was guerrilla warfare. This required the least amount of training. People (men, women and children) fought in a part-time capacity, in small bands, with each person knowing the rest of the group (and so there was no need for a distinctive uniform). The weapons were often unsophisticated and based on everyday implements such as farming tools.

Then, for about the thousand years of the European Middle Ages, wars consisted of small battles (by modern standards) and sieges of fortified positions (especially castles). There were few full-time soldiers. Knights, for example, ran feudal estates as their main source of income and recruited their own farm workers as troops when required.

✓ Second Wave

The second wave of European warfare emerged around the 17th century. The nation-state system (which international lawyers date from 1648) meant that the basic unit of political power shifted from a small tribal area to the nation-state (or country), which gave rulers more people from whom taxation and conscripts could be drawn. The industrial revolution – which began in Britain in 1750 - meant that industry could develop more destructive weapons. Also, fighting formations could be transported over longer distances. Europeans could now fight each other over colonies in the Americas, Africa and Asia.

The new form of warfare became so common that it acquired the title of "conventional" warfare. Fighting formations became larger (and almost exclusively adult males) and it was necessary for all troops to have distinctive uniforms to distinguish them from the enemy. Armies also became more specialized in their work: they were to defend national security. This meant they were taken off the maintenance of law and order and that task was given to a separate force (the police).

Armies and navies became more professional. Defence personnel were set apart from the rest of the community; they lived in separate buildings and were controlled by legal codes usually more extensive than that of the civilian legal system. Restrictions were placed on civilian access to weapons - warfare became the exclusive right of the government. For the first time, there were professional soldiers who spent large chunks of time without fighting. Previous personnel were recruited for specific campaigns and then demobilized as soon as the fighting stopped. Now personnel were in permanent employment but fighting only took up part of their time.

During the first half of the 20th century, the nature of conventional warfare changed again. It used to be about humans killing humans. Beginning in World War I, land warfare became far more mechanized. Warfare became a matter of machines killing machines. The last Allied cavalry charge was on November 8 1917, when units of the Canadian army defeated a German cavalry regiment. There were few horses used at all in World War II. In 1941, the UK had 100,000 vehicles in the Middle East. By the time of D Day in June 1944, there was one vehicle for every 4.77 Allied soldiers. 130,000 aircraft were produced in the UK in 1939-45, 119,000 German aircraft, and 303,000 American aircraft. Warfare had become an activity of quarter-masters general and production planners. Generals were more like corporate chief executive officers.

The "tail" became bigger than the "teeth". In order to keep one soldier at the front (the "teeth"), there were six persons drawn such civilian occupations as catering, engineering, medicine, building, transportation and law. Each arm of service became a society within a society.

World War II will remain the world's largest conventional war. Other wars have been longer (notably the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s). But none will be as extensive, intensive and expensive. For example, we have just been celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk (July 1943), which was the largest battle in world history – involving 4 million Soviet and German troops – and the largest tank battle in world history. There will never be another battle bigger than Kursk.

The prime factor in the decline of conventional warfare is the cost of the mechanization of warfare. Governments cannot afford the same stock of equipment as they used to acquire. Humans were comparatively cheap - they often came via conscription. But machines are expensive both to purchase and to maintain. The US B2 bomber, at US\$2.2 billion each, is said to cost three times its weight in gold. The machines are also much more destructive: they travel further with more firepower than previous weapons. But this also means that machines can be destroyed at a faster rate, with less chance of their ever being repaired.

All major conventional wars since the early 1960s, which have resulted in a clear victory, have been won in less than six weeks. If one side cannot defeat the other in that time, then the war will just drag on, such as the inconclusive Iran-Iraq war, which ran for eight years. The crucial six-week period is derived from the limitations of equipment and supply: governments can no longer afford large reserves of equipment.

✓ Third Wave

Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare – the third wave of warfare - has grown rapidly since World War II. Every conflict underway today involves guerrillas in at least one party to the conflict. Guerrilla warfare turns conventional warfare's reasoning upside down. Guerrilla warfare is essentially political - it is about winning the hearts and minds of people. It is not so much about taking and holding a set piece of territory.

Guerrillas do not need a large amount of firepower to do this because they are only carrying out sporadic raids. Too much firepower, as with the US troops in Vietnam, can alienate the local population since there is a temptation to use it wantonly. The US did not lose in Vietnam because of a shortage of firepower but partly because of the excessive use of it. They turned potential supporters away by their excessive use of force resulting in the death of innocent civilians (a mistake the Americans are now trying to avoid in Iraq).

Guerrillas can lose battle after battle and yet still win the war because guerrilla warfare is a form of attrition. There is a wearing down of the conventional forces until exhaustion and frustration set in.

As modern life has become more sophisticated, so it has become more vulnerable to disruption by guerrilla groups. A century and a half ago, for example, homes in New Zealand, Australia, Britain or the United States had to look after their own water supply - and so each household was far more self-reliant than today's reliance on a centralized reticulation system. A guerrilla group then could not disrupt a town's water supply - but nowadays it could. Similarly, electricity is now also centrally supplied.

Modern life in large cities is one of anonymity. People living next door to each other often know little about each other. A guerrilla group could operate from a city district and the neighbours would not know it (as the British army found in Northern Ireland and the Israelis continue find in the Holy Land). This anonymity makes it difficult for the military to get information. Guerrillas can melt away in the crowd, like fish in a sea – as the Americans found in Iraq after April 2003. It also helps explain the problems the US has had in finding Osama bin Laden in southern Afghanistan/ northern Pakistan.

To conclude, the new warfare state presents many new challenges for traditional military and political thinking. The situation is even more complicated when the issue of globalization is factored into our considerations.

✓ GLOBALIZATION

The largest military operation in the South Pacific since World War II is now underway. An Australian-led regional force has intervened in the Solomons Islands (at the invitation of the national parliament). This may be the beginning of a new era because Australia and New Zealand have previously resisted all calls for military interventions in the region's upheavals.

There is now greater official recognition that many of the South Pacific countries are close to becoming "failed states" (the Solomons being the region's first such "failed state"). That there should be any discussion of such a crisis seems unusual. After all, the region was so pro-American in the Cold War that the Soviet Union and China made very few attempts to export any tensions there. It was one of the few areas of the world that was largely by-passed by direct Cold War confrontations. It was an "American lake". The region is potentially wealthy, not least from the sea and tourism. The countries are separated by large distances of water and so unlike (say) in Africa, there can be no mass migrations to the South Pacific of people fleeing conflicts in Africa or Asia. All of the countries have links with western developed countries and have received much aid from them. Indeed, on a per capita basis, more aid has probably gone to this region than to any other region in the world. But not one country can be held up as a sparkling success story of decolonisation.

What has gone wrong?

The essence of the problem, I suggest, is globalization. The world is moving from an era when national boundaries were very important, to one where they are not. "Globalization" for me refers to the declining power of national governments generally. This is more than just economics. It is how the world is being ordered. An entire era is passing away.

National governments are a comparatively new idea. International lawyers date them from 1648: the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe and the Treaty of Westphalia (hence the name of the present world order: "Westphalian System"). Prior to that time people in Europe lived in small tribes, possibly as part of a large empire, or in city-states. There were few countries as we know them today.

No one suddenly decided in 1648 to create the Westphalian System. It was only with the benefit of hindsight that people could see that a new world order had been created as a result of the breaking up of the Holy Roman Empire. Peoples ("nations") were now to be governed by "states", hence the title of nation-states (as distinct from, say, the previous "city-states"). As the Europeans colonised the world, so they took this system with them. The newly-independent colonies based themselves on the nation-state system (such as in Africa, where about 55 nation-states have been imposed on a patchwork quilt of about 200 major tribes). The United Nations currently has 191 nation-state members, with East Timor as the newest member.

The nation-state system is now so prevalent that it is seen as the norm in world politics. It has worn well but now it is wearing out. National governments are no longer so relevant to world politics. Instead, national governments are having to share their power in three ways.

✓ **Economic Globalisation**

Economic globalisation is being driven by transnational corporations, which are now the major player in world economics. They – rather than national governments – set the pace of economic change. The anti-globalisation demonstrators are right to identify the problems that some corporations create, such as the exploitation of labour (including child labour), manipulating national taxation regimes to avoid paying tax and environmental destruction.

They can also play havoc with foreign currency transactions. For example, American banker Andy Krieger was one of the legends of the foreign currency speculators and in the late 1980s he particularly speculated on the NZ\$ (“Kiwi”). On one occasion he sold roughly the entire money supply of New Zealand. New Zealand finance officials privately told him that they did not mind his driving down the price of the Kiwi because it would make exports cheaper and spur economic growth. This 25 year old could do what the government could not – drive down the Kiwi’s value and force economic change on a lethargic business community .

But it is worth noting that the corporations are responding to consumer demand. They make available what people want to buy. They may stimulate consumer demand but they did not create it. Many people with money have opted for a consumption-driven lifestyle. They have been exercising their free will. As The Economist magazine pointed out, “McDonald’s does not march people into its outlets at the point of a gun. Nike does not require people to wear its trainers on pain of imprisonment. If people buy those things, it is because they choose to, not because globalization is forcing them” .

Additionally, while many people in developing countries do have appalling lives working in factories, no country has yet found a smooth way to move from an agricultural society to an industrial one. The British suffered from the industrial revolution in the 19th century; now it is the turn of many Asian countries. Besides, current life on a peasant farm is also very harsh and ought not to be romanticised – hence the attraction of the bright lights in the cities.

✓ **Popular Globalisation**

But the globalisation trend has some positive developments. A second form of globalisation consists of “people power” movements (non-governmental organizations or civil society organizations). These are a way for ordinary people to work together for a better world. Their members are disenchanted with politicians because they have such little power. Therefore

the people have decided to set their own agenda. Examples include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and World Vision.

Ironically, some of the opponents of globalization use the products of globalisation to oppose economic globalisation, such as their use of cyberspace, with elaborate websites. They also know how to use the international mass media to play to a global audience. They know how to tap into the growing worries that people in many countries have about economic globalisation. All of these events are a feat worthy of a massive advertising budget of a transnational corporation, such as Coca-Cola or McDonalds. But it is all done cheaply by the Internet, e-mail, word of mouth and graffiti.

✓ **Public Order Globalisation**

The final example of globalisation is “public order globalisation”. There are no national solutions to transnational problems. Pollution, diseases, and changes in weather patterns are all examples of a country’s inability to solve its problems on its own. A country may have a fine record in environmental protection, for example, but this will be of little value if it is living downwind of a dirty country. Similarly global diseases are not new (for example, the Plague destroyed about one-third of Europe between 1348 and 1350). But what is new is the speed with which a virus can move around the world. Thanks to aviation, a virus is only 36 hours at most from every other part of the globe. Therefore governments have to work together, not because they like to do so but because they have little choice. They either work together or perish separately. Until the recent expansion of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, about 80 per cent of the UN’s money went on economic and social co-operation. This work is done by the UN every day, all day, via its specialized bodies such as the World Health Organization, UN Environmental Programme, International Maritime Organization and the UN Children’s Fund. If the UN disappeared today, it would be necessary to invent it to do these basic tasks that we take for granted.

This is called “functional co-operation”: getting experts to work together out of the public eye . The other type of international cooperation is “political co-operation”. But this is often hampered because politicians like to approach every issue with an open mouth (such as the current negotiations over the Middle East). But technicians can get together via functional co-operation and gradually knit the world together in a system of mutually beneficial arrangements, such as the standardisation of telephone systems and the exchange of information on diseases and weather. This is not exciting work and it is usually ignored by the mass media – but this is what improves the daily life of many people.

✓ THE SOUTH PACIFIC'S PROBLEMS IN COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION

First, almost all the countries are “micro-states” and have some difficulty coping with the requirements of international law and international politics. There are 19 entities, ranging in population size of 5.2 million in Papua New Guinea to 1,000 in Tokelau. This list includes French Polynesia and New Caledonia, which are still territories of metropolitan France and which may eventually become independent. There are other territories in addition, such as Pitcairn Island (a British dependent territory with less than a 100 people and the wreck of Captain Bligh’s ship “The Bounty”) and American Samoa (which is now effectively part of the United States). 12 of those 19 entities are in the United Nations. Seven million or so people – out of the world’s total population of six billion - constitute about six per cent of the UN’s total member-states. It is a great financial burden being represented by professional diplomats at international gatherings, let alone maintaining all the other trappings of national status, such as national air lines and military forces. It is like a poor person determined to belong to an expensive exclusive Wellington club.

Second, a related issue is “constitutional colonialism”. The outgoing imperial powers left elaborate national constitutions based on their own centuries of evolution of democratic tradition. Many of these documents have run into trouble. They were not applicable to the local political cultures. This is not to make a value judgment on the worth of the pre-existing South Pacific political traditions. It is simply a recognition that the traditions were different and that it was an error to try to graft western constitutions onto different political cultures. There has often been little sense of local ownership of the constitutions.

A related issue is “educational colonialism”. Teachers teach what they were taught. The outgoing colonial powers failed to provide education that would be a suitable preparation for an independent country in the South Pacific. Perhaps the educators did not themselves know what would be required and so were guided by what they did back in their metropolitan countries. After all, these countries have had spirited national debates over what is relevant for their own peoples. If they could not get it right for the home populations, perhaps the colonial peoples stood even less chance of a receiving a relevant education.

Third, since 1970, the South Pacific has received about US\$50 billion in foreign aid. But there is little “development” to show for it. Part of the problem is that aid now tends to be given to assist the donor rather than the recipient. Most aid is “tied, bilateral” aid rather than “untied” aid given through multilateral aid organizations, such as the United Nations. For example, most of Australia’s foreign aid never leaves Australia. Some of it goes to Australian universities to educate students from the South Pacific.

Another explanation has come from a debate triggered by a publication in May 2003 by the Australian academic (and former World Bank economist) Helen Hughes. She is critical of foreign aid programmes and has recommended that they be stopped to the South Pacific because the money is used for corrupt purposes in those countries and breeds a culture of dependency.

What has particularly generated a debate is her claim that the system of common land holdings has hindered the creation of an entrepreneurial culture. The South Pacific way of life has made anthropology a local growth industry for westerners (such as the Margaret Mead). The foreigners have come from cultures based on greed, the Protestant work ethic and individual enterprise and they have tended to see the South Pacific way of life as having many attractive alternative features. But Hughes has argued that “not one country in the world has developed on the basis of communal land ownership”. She has also argued that “clan loyalty, admirable in traditional societies, is inappropriate for a high income modern society... Clan loyalty makes it impossible for individuals to save and invest”.

Meanwhile, aimless, unemployed youths drift out of the decaying, suffocating villages into the cities (which tend to be more important recipients of foreign aid). But they have little scope for employment and so they drift into crime, drugs and sexual diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Much of the violence in the South Pacific countries (such as in the Solomons and Papua New Guinea’s troubled capital city Port Moresby) comes from crime rather than some clear political agenda. There is an undertone of frustration and racism derived from unemployment and resentment at the wealth of others – rather than a political ideology of some sort. Communists and Islamic fanatics cannot be blamed for any of this.

Additionally, economic decline feeds upon itself. Unstable countries lose a major source of foreign tourist income. After the first coup in Fiji in 1987, the Solomon Islands ran an advertising campaign in Australian travel magazines: “Come to the Solomons, the fighting ended here in 1945”. Nowadays, tourists do not go to Solomons, either.

To conclude, the outlook is more likely to get worse than better. First, the Australian and New Zealand governments have had no great enthusiasm for the intervention in the Solomons. Their involvement has been largely due to September 11 2001 and the fear that the Solomons, as a failed state, could eventually become a host to international terrorist groups. I doubt that that would have happened. But that is clearly the reasoning of the Australian Prime Minister John Howard. Australians have rallied behind the operation because they now like to rally behind their defence force. The mood could have turned sour if Australian soldiers had been killed and there were fears of an emerging “Vietnam”-type quagmire. Australians are not interested in South Pacific military adventures and they have no imperial aspirations. They do not want their government making a habit of these South Pacific ventures. They are not interested in Australia becoming the regional sheriff.

Second, it seems that the domestic situation in many South Pacific countries will get even worse. For example, adult onset diabetes is increasingly the main health problem of the islands. Nauru has one of the world’s worst rates (co-equal with some American First Nations in Arizona). South Pacific Islanders are more sedentary, eating more sugary Western foodstuffs and less traditional foods than their forebears. Their genetic inheritance has equipped them to survive food shortages by storing fat on their bodies. The genes are not equipped to cope with a flood of sugar and dairy fats. All the national healthcare systems have enough problems coping with

existing health problems. The diabetes epidemic will overwhelm the healthcare systems (such as the problems of surgical operations and the shortage of rehabilitation staff).

Finally, the growing speculation over global climate change suggests that the South Pacific's vulnerability to environmental problems will increase. Rising sea levels are engulfing parts of some of the countries. The rising sea level comes from both the melting of the polar ice caps and the fact that warm water expands. A country does not need to be inundated to be uninhabitable. Rising seas levels will bring salt water into areas that are used for cultivation. Tuvalu's 11,000 citizens may become the world's first country to claim that they are all "environmental refugees" and so seek asylum in Australia or New Zealand.

To conclude, the regional intervention force in the Solomons is only the tip of the South Pacific national insecurity iceberg. The region has many problems, not least the fact that so few countries outside the region are concerned about its fate.

✓ **THE SOLOMONS AS A FAILED STATE**

The crisis in the Solomon may be seen, I suggest, as a case study of the problems of coping with globalization and the weaknesses in the nation-state system. First, many of the problems in the South Pacific are legacies from the era of European colonialism. The European impact will long be felt in the South Pacific. 80 per cent of the current national borders in the world were created by Europeans. Similarly, most of the nation-states in the South Pacific were created by Europeans without heed to the local history or culture. The Solomons have been inhabited for about 3,000 years. The first Europeans to arrive there were the Spanish in the 16th century, who had been sent from their colony in Peru to look for the fabled "lost isles" of King Solomon, reputed to be full of gold and silver. Ironically, there is some gold on the islands but there is far more wealth in the sea from fish, palm oil, timber reserves and foreign tourism. If the country had been able to develop economically, it could be quite wealthy in South Pacific terms.

The South Pacific colonies were exploited by "mercenaries, missionaries and misfits". The Solomons certainly had its share of the first two. In the late 19th century, the islands were raided by mercenaries known as "blackbirders" who were capturing labourers to work on the plantations in Queensland and Fiji. A total of about 30,000 Solomon Islanders are believed to have been taken to these foreign lands between 1870 and 1911. The British government established a protectorate on the main islands in 1893 to try to stop this forced labour. Other islands were taken over between 1898 and 1899. A group of separately running islands therefore found themselves now subjects of the British Queen in the same colony.

The missionaries were also busy in the islands. The Solomons is a strongly Christian country, where visitors will be asked for details of their Christian denomination in much the same

way that New Zealanders or Australians will talk about which sporting teams they support. The churches are full and very active. They provide a range of welfare services.

The British did little to prepare the country for independence. After World War II (in which the Solomons suffered a great deal) the British were anxious to get out of all their colonies as quickly as possible with as little expenditure as necessary. The Solomons became independent of Britain in 1978, though the Queen remains the head of state. The country has a population of about 450,000, with English as the national language (though with 68 other languages still spoken across the islands). In 2000, the then prime minister, Bartholomew Ulafa'alu, noted that the: "Solomon Islands is a melting pot of different races. In the west, we are close to the Australian Aborigines. In the east, we are Malay; in the north, Melanesian; and in the south, Tongan. We are united because of external power. [It was] the imposition of unity. History shows ethnic tensions in post-British societies because the development [under the British] was not deeply rooted, not equally distributed...It was networks of cronies in power that held countries together".

Second, there are the problems of poor economic development. The South Pacific's problems are not just ethnic. Racial labels are often just used for political purposes. Economic growth is the glue that now holds societies together. A lack of economic growth means a lack of glue. All the South Pacific countries have pockets of poverty, some worse than others. In all previous centuries, people were poor but they did not know it because they had no external frame of reference. Now – thanks to economic globalization - radio and television have brought the world into their villages, and they can compare their plight with the people who live well elsewhere. Similarly, they can compare their lives with those of the foreign tourists who visit their countries.

Many of the western-style economic development formulae over the past three decades have not worked. Governments have encouraged people to move into cash crops, companies to borrow from overseas banks, and foreign companies to invest. They have done what the textbooks have laid down. Western consultants have done well in selling the advice but the countries have not necessarily done well in buying it.

Meanwhile, there are unemployment problems in Australia and New Zealand and so there are tighter immigration restrictions. These mean that there are not the same opportunities for South Pacific islanders to work overseas temporarily, with the hope of sending money back home.

Overshadowing these developments is the unequal struggle between small island governments and transnational corporations. The latter can play governments off against each in the search for resources and manufacturing locations. They can bribe local politicians and manipulate the local media (such as through the purchasing power of advertisements). They can also recruit local opinion formers and business leaders to be their advocates. The process of economic globalization has proceeded so quickly that government leaders have been blind-sided by change and caught by surprise. Various people (including myself) have written on this process

for many years. But the politicians and their officials have not paid attention and now it is probably too late to reverse economic globalization. They need to find ways of making the most of the new era – and they seem equally unsuccessful in that as well.

Third, there is the problem of weak states and the need for a strong leader. A developed country has a weak leader and a strong state. In other words, the New Zealand, British or Australian prime minister can go overseas, and the country will continue to run much as before in their absence. There will no military coup, government salaries will be paid and trains will run. Many apolitical citizens may not even notice or care about the temporary absence of their leader overseas.

In many developing countries, however, there is a weak state and a strong leader. In other words, the death of a leader may see major changes occur because the state is so dependent on the leader setting the sense of national direction. A problem for the South Pacific is the lack strong states. There are problems of corruption, lack of transparency and a lack of stability. The culture of democracy in developed countries did not develop overnight; it evolved after many decades, if not centuries, of trial and error. Developing countries have not had long enough to develop their own culture of democracy.

In short, the fear among some Australian commentators is that the intervention in the Solomons really is the beginning of a new era. Many of the issues in the Solomons are systemic for the entire region. For example, all the countries have borders imposed by European colonialists to suit their map-making ambitions rather than to approximate with ethnic groups, they have small domestic markets, a narrow resource and production base, high units costs of infrastructure, heavy dependence on external trade and are vulnerable to environmental disasters such as cyclones. The July 2003 intervention could be simply the beginning of an era in which more and more operations are required.

Disarming militia groups and restoring law and order are difficult enough. Trying to rebuild – or build for the first time – economic and social infrastructure will be even more difficult. As the post-colonial experiences in Africa and Asia have shown, there is no one standard formula for economic and social growth.

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, it is necessary to acknowledge that this is a new era that requires new ways of thinking. The old formulae will not necessarily work. For example, this paper has argued that guerrilla warfare is the major form of warfare in the future. But this is not reflected in the conventional warfare-bias in defence expenditure. Much more money should go into training for guerrilla operations and UN peacekeeping operations (such as the expansion of the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre, at Newcastle, NSW). Meanwhile, I am doubtful about the

need for Australia to go ahead with the purchase of new tanks. They are more a prestige item for the Army rather than a necessary tool for the new warfare state.

Second, Australia has signed up for the US national missile defence programme. This is also a waste of money. Even the conservative Australian newspaper *The Australian Financial Review* has expressed reservations: "The idea of destroying missiles before they can do any damage is attractive. But it is also far-fetched and risky. The [Australian] government hasn't made out a compelling case for climbing aboard, or if it has, it hasn't bothered to share it with us".

Third, countries should have a foreign policy philosophy that would require a new approach to settling problems. It would be based more on what unites countries - rather than on what divides them: public order globalization. This would include the need to work together through the United Nations on promoting economic development, protecting the environment (for instance ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on climate change) and promoting human rights.

Fourth, there should also be increased foreign aid. The UN target (which is met by only four of the 22 developed countries) is 0.7 per cent GNP. Australia is one of those that have got meaner as they have got richer, and is well away from the UN foreign aid target. Additionally, the aid should be "untied" and put through multilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations (rather than kept in Australia and handed out to businesses and universities).

The usual question is: where will all the money come from? Well, when we want to find the money, we can do so. It is a matter of having the right priorities. We can find money for war – we should be able to find money for peace. Preventing conflict from breaking out is, in the long run, a lot cheaper than actually having to fight conflicts.

Keith Suter

NOTES

1. See: Keith Suter "From Boer War to East Timor: Warfare in the 20th Century", [Contemporary Review \(London\)](#), December 1999, pp 287-293.
2. See: Karl Heinz-Frieser et al "Kursk – Sixty Years On", [Journal of the Royal United Services Institute \(London\)](#), October 2003, pp 78-89.
3. For example, in 1974, I interviewed some of the survivors of the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam. The survivors had little sympathy for the National Liberation Front/ Viet Cong. But at least the NLF/VC were restrained in their use of violence because they had so little ammunition. They had to make the most of it. This was not a problem for the Americans, who occasionally fired weapons just out of boredom.

4. The phrase comes from: Peter Hayes et al [American Lake: How the Nuclear Build Up in the Cause of "Peace" Fuels the Threat of War](#), London: Penguin, 1986.
5. The only South Pacific country with a sizable enough population to have a "mass" movement of people would be PNG. The only other potential mass movement (though strictly outside the South Pacific region) would be a Chinese exodus from Indonesia south into Australia if there were again anti-Chinese riots amid civil unrest. In 1965-6 the Chinese fled north into Singapore/ Malaysia. The Australian Government is evidently counting on them going in that direction again if Indonesia falls into chaos and people pick on the minority of rich Chinese as scapegoats.
6. See: Keith Suter [Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-State](#), Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.
7. See: Keith Suter [Global Agenda: Economics, the Environment and the Nation-State](#), Sydney: Albatross, 1995.
8. See: Frank Partnoy [Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets](#), London Profile Books, 2003, pp 19-24.
9. "Is Globalization Doomed?" [The Economist](#) (London), September 29 2001, p 13.
10. See: Keith Suter [In Defence of Globalization](#), Kensington: University of New South Wales Press, 2000.
11. See: David Mitrany [The Functional Theory of Politics](#) London: Martin Robertson, 1975.
12. Helen Hughes "Aid Has Failed the Pacific", [Issue Analysis](#) Number 33, Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, May 7 2003.
13. Ibid, p 11.
14. Ibid, p 12.
15. For an introduction, see: Elsin Wainwright et al [Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands](#), Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003.
16. Strategic Policy Institute, 2003.
17. Rowan Callick "Papua New Guinea and the Pacific" in Stephen Mills (Editor) [Asian Business Insight](#), Sydney: Financial Review Library, 1995, p 246.
18. Bartholomew Ulufa'alu quoted in: Jean Ker Walsh "The Region's Crunch Time" Eureka Street (Melbourne), (Vol 10, No 6), July-August 2000, p "Missile Plan Needs Proper Appraisal", [The Australian Financial Review](#) (Sydney), December 6 2003, p 70, Australian politician Pauline Hanson in the late 1990s triggered a national debate over the value of foreign aid. She complained that the money was being sent overseas (which was the case in the 1960s and 1970s). This was now a quaint view because (as noted above) most of it stays in Australia and goes into Australian businesses (including universities). The government was eventually forced to reply to her complaints and defend foreign aid. It was pressured into doing so by the Australian business community (which lobbied the government via the deputy prime minister who was the minister for trade) because the business community did well out of foreign aid and did not want Ms Hanson with her 1960s perception of foreign aid ruining the support they derived from government.